“Outstanding in their leniency”? Firearms cases in the Belfast courts

From the start of the Pogrom in July 1920 until the end of 1922, there were almost 350 prosecutions in courts in Belfast, under different pieces of legislation, for various firearms offences ranging from simple possession to murder. At one point, there was a public complaint that the courts were being “Outstanding in their leniency” in how they treated defendants. Who were these defendants, what verdicts were returned and what do their cases tell us about the operation of the judicial system in Belfast during this period?

Estimated reading time: 30 minutes

The law and the courts

Then in mid-February 1922, a government notice headed “Firearms Act 1920” was inserted in the press:

However, possession of firearms was one thing – using them was a far more serious matter and of course, murder and attempted murder were already crimes on the statute books. As a result of the Pogrom, 502 people died in Belfast and over two thousand were wounded. British troops acknowledged at coroners’ inquests that they had been responsible for 51 of those killings; similarly, the police and Ulster Special Constabulary (USC or “Specials”) killed a further 21 people during rioting, for curfew violations or in confronting the IRA or loyalist paramilitaries. Deducting both of these, which were legally sanctioned as being carried out by arms of the state in the course of their duties, leaves 430 other killings.

Finally, as the IRA – and, presumably, corresponding organisations on the loyalist side – carried out armed robberies to raise funds, prosecutions for such offences are also included in the analysis.

People charged with any of these laws, which are gathered here under the umbrella term “firearms offences,” could appear in a variety of courts.

Crumlin Road Courthouse, where many of the cases were heard

The first port of call was usually the Belfast Custody Court, also known colloquially as the Belfast Police Court. Here, a magistrate sitting without a jury could impose a punishment if the defendant pleaded guilty or could remand the defendant to a sitting of the Courts of Petty Sessions. These also featured a magistrate sitting without a jury, who could reach a summary verdict.

Denis Henry, first Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland

These various civil courts were supplemented by the courts-martial provided for by the ROIA, which continued to try cases in Belfast until at least October 1921. Court-martial hearings could be reported on in the press, while defendants were entitled to – but did not always avail of – legal representation in all courts, whether civil or military.

The defendants

Those who appeared before the courts can be categorised under a number of headings.

In keeping with the principle of “innocent until proven guilty,” anyone who was acquitted or against whom the Crown entered a nolle prosequi (dropped the charges) is assumed to have been a civilian, unless it can be established from other sources that they were actually combatants.

Most of the IRA members tried can be found in the nominal rolls held in Military Archives’ Military Service Pensions Collection. However, there were a small number not listed in the nominal rolls who said in court that they were members of the IRA – as such a statement was hardly likely to improve their chances of acquittal, they are taken as being in the IRA.

Similarly, any defendant who said they were a member of the Specials is also taken at their word.

A number of defendants refused to recognise the courts – this identifies them as being Republicans, without being able to specify whether they were IRA or Fianna members. A similar formulation backfired for an unnamed teenager who was charged with being in possession of a revolver and ammunition; the boy’s father had succeeded in persuading the court to allow him to provide bail for his son but,

A cyclist being searched in Belfast, February 1922

Where someone could not be identified as a member of the IRA, Fianna or Specials, their name and surname were checked in the 1911 Census and while someone’s religion is not a foolproof guide to their political persuasion, it is a useful indicator as to whether they were a nationalist or a loyalist. For example, everyone named William Stratton in the Census was Presbyterian, Methodist or a member of the Church of Ireland, so the William Stratton tried for possession of a revolver by a court-martial in February 1921 is assumed to be a loyalist.

Not all those thus identified as loyalists or nationalists were necessarily involved in the sectarian violence that gripped the city. Guns were plentiful in Belfast at the time so some people took the opportunity to commit armed robberies for motives that were more entrepreneurial than political.

In some instances, there were simply too many people of the same name but differing religions in the Census to be able to say with any certainty which side of the political divide they were on, so they are classed as unidentified.

With this in mind, the numbers of defendants were as follows:

  • Civilians                   89
  • IRA                            67
  • Fianna                       2
  • Republicans             15
  • Nationalists              63
  • Specials                    14
  • Loyalists                   82
  • Unidentified             12

The relaxed demeanour of this man being searched in March 1922 suggests that he has nothing to hide

The charges – murder and attempted murder

Given that there were 430 killings other than those for which Crown forces had legal sanction, the most striking thing about prosecutions for murder is that there were so few of them – for these 430 killings, only 12 people were charged with murder.

As nationalists accounted for 57% of all fatalities of the Pogrom, it is of little surprise that these murder charges involved seven nationalist victims, one Special and three unionist civilians (two cases involved more than one defendant, while one man was charged with killing two women).

All 12 of those charged with murder were acquitted – these included one member of the IRA, one Special and two loyalist paramilitaries; by virtue of being found not guilty, the other eight are counted as civilians.

The common factor leading to acquitals was that some witnesses provided evidence of the defendant’s guilt, while others swore they were innocent.

A British army armoured car patrolling Foundry St, where Joseph McLeod was shot dead seven weeks later (Illustrated London News, 1st September 1920)

The funeral of IRA member Murtagh McAstocker

The police had only slightly more success in prosecuting people for shooting at someone “with   intent to murder” – the intended victim was even named in the vast majority of such charges. There were 54 people charged with this offence, but only 16 were found guilty.

Those found guilty included four members of the IRA, one of Na Fianna (Daniel O’Toole mentioned above), seven other nationalists and four loyalists. Those acquitted included a member of the IRA, a Special and two loyalist paramilitaries, the remainder being civilians.

Given that the intended victims were still alive to give testimony in court, it may be surprising that there were so many acquitals but again, evidence was inevitably contradictory, while there were often family members, friends or others from the same community willing to provide alibis, whether real or false.

The charges – possession

The police had most success in court with charges of illegal possession of firearms, rather than murder or attempted murder. Of the 278 defendants charged with possession of weapons and/or ammunition, only 22% were acquitted, including 51 civilians, seven Specials and three members of the IRA. This includes those charged with armed robbery, as even if a weapon was not recovered by the police, its presence at the scene was implied.

Some defendants pleaded that they had simply found the firearm or ammunition in question, some even claimed to be bringing them to the police barracks when arrested. This became so commonplace that one exasperated magistrate exclaimed that he would no longer tolerate it as an excuse:

A group of B Specials (Police Museum, Belfast)

The sentences

Defendants who were found guilty faced a wide variety of sentences.

Eleven of those found guilty of attempted murder received sentences of a year’s imprisonment or less, the other five were sentenced to either three, six, ten or 15 years.

Two IRA members even had their sentences explicitly reduced by the trial judge: brothers Robert and William Carmichael of the IRA’s A Company, 2nd Battalion were convicted for shooting at shopkeeper William Douthart and unnamed others during rioting on the Oldpark Road in October 1920; when it came to sentencing, the judge said,

Such lax sentencing clearly disturbed the editor of the Belfast Telegraph, who complained:

Charlie Ryan (extreme right), celebrating his release from prison with Joe McKelvey (centre, in uniform) and other members of B Company (L to R): Seán O’Sullivan, Aloysius “Wish” Fox, Phillip Ryan (his brother) and unknown

From the start of 1922, as the violence intensified and the Firearms Act came into operation, there was a noticeable increase in both the number of prosecutions and the severity of sentencing.

By the time some of these prisoners came to be sentenced, the Special Powers Act had been passed, so nine of them also had punishments of flogging imposed, including up to 15 lashes of the cat-o’-nine-tails or strokes of the birch. Flogging was not an alternative to a custodial sentence – it was not an either-or, it was as-well-as.

Under the Special Powers Act, defendants found guilty could be flogged with the cat-o’-nine-tails in addition to being imprisoned

As the overall scale of the violence diminished, the number of prosecutions for firearms offences in the second half of 1922 was much reduced, with 50 people being convicted. However, sentencing remained punitive – 25 men got up to 12 months’ imprisonment, while the same number got longer sentences, the longest being seven years. Meanwhile, the application of flogging as an additional punishment intensified, with 21 of those convicted also being subjected to either the “cat” or the birch.

When we look at the even-handedness of sentencing, if anyone benefitted from the leniency that so exercised the Belfast Telegraph, it was the loyalists who made up the bulk of that paper’s readership.

In the period from July 1920 to December 1921, nine loyalists were fined while 13 received custodial sentences, only two of which were for a year or more; the comparable figures for IRA, Republicans and nationalists combined were two fined and 16 imprisoned, 12 of them for more than a year. All the IRA members convicted in that period received prison sentences, which is unsurprising given that they were engaged in armed rebellion.

Sentencing of non-Republican nationalists was broadly in line with the 24% of overall convictions for which they accounted: they were 26% of those sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment or more and 27% of those flogged.

However, members of the IRA and Fianna were the most likely to receive harsh sentences, reflecting their attempt to overthrow the state: they represented 35% of those convicted but 39% of those sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment or more and 40% of those flogged.

The arms

There were 129 people caught red-handed with weapons and/or ammunition on them, or on people they were with, at the time they were arrested.

British military searching a motor-cycle for arms

The authorities had more success finding weapons in the course of searching houses and other premises – a total of 68 rifles, 48 revolvers and 83 bombs were found this way. Arising from these searches, 103 people were charged – again, some instances involved more defendants than weapons, such as the incident in Disraeli St mentioned above.

Police conducting a search for arms in Library St in June 1922

The largest single haul found by the police was in a house belonging to James Doherty in Dunville St in Clonard; there, they discovered 34 rifles, 12 revolvers, 30 bombs, 2 Verey pistols and several thousand rounds of ammunition. This had been the arms dump for B Company, 1st Battalion of the IRA since the previous year:

Other arms dumps

In fact, a string of IRA arms dumps were captured at the start of July 1922, which led the O/C of its 3rd Northern Division, Séamus Woods, to complain:

IRA arms dump in Milan St, captured on 29th June 1922

Altogether, discovery of such dumps meant the police captured an additional 25 rifles and 18 revolvers, as well as 38 loose bombs and seven full cases of bombs.

Summary and conclusions

The police and courts had a wide range of legislation relating to firearms offences at their disposal, beginning with the DORA and ROIA Regulations, later supplemented by the provisions of the Firearms Act and finally by the Special Powers Act.

In terms of their willingness to enforce this legislation, the RIC and later the RUC engaged in institutional double-think.

While they did not lack legal powers, or the inclination to use them, what the police did lack in terms of securing convictions was evidence. This was particularly the case for the most serious charges of murder and attempted murder, where although the police thought they had the basis for pursuing a prosecution, the defence could, more often than not, provide enough exonerating evidence to secure an acquittal. Only where the proof seemed incontrovertible – when someone was physically caught with firearms on their person or in their home – would a conviction prove more likely, and even then, a skilled barrister might still secure a release.

On balance, the courts also appear to have applied the laws impartially when cases came before them – they were by no means the judicial wing of the Specials. The verdicts reached put paid to any notion that juries were inherently biased in one direction or the other.

There were identical numbers of IRA members and loyalist paramilitaries acquitted: five of each. Nine Specials were acquited, four of them because the permits for which they had applied had not yet been issued, also leaving five.

At the same time, there were more Republicans convicted (56 IRA, two Fianna and 14 unspecified) than Specials (a mere four), but this is to be expected as Republicans were at war with the state. There were more non-state loyalists convicted than non-Republican nationalists, 67 versus 48, but this is also to be expected as most of the violence was directed at nationalist civilians.

When it came to sentencing, the apparent readiness of the courts – even including the courts-martial – to simply shrug their judicial shoulders and merely impose a fine for possession of firearms is just staggering. This, however, was mainly in the earlier phase of the Pogrom, when the level of killings had not yet reached its peak. As the fatal violence escalated during the spring and early summer of 1922, the sentences imposed were much harsher and continued in that vein in the second half of that year, even after the worst of the violence had subsided.

The fact that Republicans were more likely to receive the harshest sentences – lengthy sentences of over a year’s imprisonment, with or without flogging – probably reflects the defendants’ motives more than the judges’ bias: of course the state was going to disproportionately punish those trying to overthrow it.

But neither were the harshest sentences reserved for Republicans. Three of the four Specials convicted were sentenced to prison terms of a year or more, as were 38 of the 55 IRA members convicted; the proportions are 75% and 69% respectively. Of course, no Specials were sentenced to flogging, although nine IRA members were – the state would only go so far in punishing its own.

However, non-state loyalists who were convicted did generally get off more lightly – they were over-represented among those simply fined and under-represented among those receiving the harshest sentences. This might suggest a level of indulgence of loyalist violence on the part of the courts – but set against that potential criticism is the Disraeli St case where nine loyalists each got 18 months in jail for possession of two rifles between them.

In total, the police captured 99 rifles (including carbines and shotguns), 164 revolvers and 111 loose bombs, as well as seven full cases of bombs. This was obviously only a tiny proportion of all the illegally-held firearms in Belfast at the time, but it does reinforce the most notable conclusion of this study.

The scale of the violence in Belfast was such that the police were simply over-whelmed when it came to quelling it, either at the particular moment in time or in seeking to prosecute those responsible afterwards. All too often, when rioting erupted, they were forced to call on the British military for assistance in suppressing it – the police alone could not cope. Nor could they watch every derelict or burned-out building for the possible presence of snipers. Nor could they hope to catch the culprits who broke into peoples’ homes, killed them and then stole away, leaving no witnesses.

Similarly, there were simply too many weapons held illegally by too many groups for the police to ever capture more than a small fraction of them. Of course, it did not help that many of the weapons with which the violence was carried out were held legally – either in the police’s own barracks or issued to the Specials.

But even allowing for this state complicity, one stark fact underlines the powerlessness of the more conscientious Belfast police and of the courts when it came to firearms offences: 430 killings took place for which there was no legal sanction, but only 12 people were even prosecuted for murder and none were convicted.

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