Who was responsible for the killings?

The fog of war and chaos of rioting do not completely obscure who carried out the killings in Belfast during the Pogrom. This blog post explores the extent to which responsibility for those killings can be attributed.

Estimated reading time: 45 minutes.

Introduction

For the period covered by their book – up to the end of December 1921 – there were 175 civilians killed in Belfast and it is actually possible to say with a reasonable degree of certainty who killed all but 76 of those. O’Halpin and Ó Corráin continued:

This is partly true in relation to the time frame they have examined, when the vast majority of civilian deaths were due to rioting, but does not hold for 1922, as the predominant setting for killings moved from rioting to a combination of close-range and sniper attacks, when the killers’ targets were selected precisely on grounds of religion.

In addition to civilians, 78 combatants died as a result of the Pogrom and it is possible to assign agency in all but eight of those cases.

Of the 501 fatalities in Belfast, a considerable number remain unattributable: 180, or 36% of the total, for precisely the reasons outlined by O’Halpin and Ó Corráin – there were too many potential killers at work to be certain who killed whom. This post concentrates on the 64% of killings – almost two-thirds – for which, with varying degrees of precision, it is possible to say who was responsible.

Killings by the IRA

In terms of killings that can be attributed to a particular organisation, the IRA killed 53 people, more than any other single combatant group: 27 members of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and Ulster Special Constabulary (USC, or “Specials”), two loyalist combatants, 21 unionist and three nationalist civilians.

Thanks to the richness of the archival material held by Military Archives, in both the Bureau of Military History (BMH) witness statements and the files of the Military Service Pensions Collection (MSPC), we even know the individual identities of those involved in many of the killings for which the IRA was responsible, particularly ones in which regular RIC or Specials died.

Altogether, the IRA was responsible for killing 27 of the 32 regular RIC and Specials killed in Belfast during the Pogrom – in all but nine of those cases, the names of some or all of the IRA men involved are known.

Séamus Timoney, one of the IRA men who killed two Specials in May St on 23rd March 1922 (photo courtesy Emily Twomey)

For the killings of unionist civilians, some assumptions need to be made.

In addition, the IRA is known to have imported a quantity of Thompson submachine guns from the United States in 1921; some of these were subsequently sent to Belfast. As there is no evidence of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) in the city having access to either hand-grenades or submachine guns, it is assumed that any attacks on unionist civilians using such weapons were carried out by the IRA.

The aftermath of the killing of Unionist MP William Twadell

In contrast to the attacks on regular police and Specials, when it came to attacks on unionist civilians, IRA veterans were noticeably more reticent about identifying those responsible. However, one who was somewhat less tight-lipped was Montgomery, who identified the man responsible for the bombing of a tram in Royal Avenue in November 1921, in which four men were killed:

Apart from David Cunningham, a member of the Ulster Imperial Guards killed by a bomb thrown on the Newtownards Road on 22nd November 1921, one other Imperial Guard was killed by the IRA – Alex Reid, shot dead in Cromac St in the Market on 30th November 1921:

Killings by the British military

British troops man a makeshift barricade

All but eight of the killings by British troops took place before the end of the watershed month of November 1921, after which the Unionist government relied more heavily on the re-mobilised and expanded Specials. Thirty-nine of these 43 killings happened during rioting (the other four were curfew-related), illustrating the degree to which the authorities turned to the British military to quell such disturbances in this period.

Apart from the Special Constable shot attempting to escape, the remainder of the eight killings by British military in 1922 involved two loyalist combatants killed in action and five more people killed during rioting.

Although O’Halpin and Ó Corráin argue that the fog of war obscures responsibility for killings during rioting, we know that British troops killed these people – because they said they did. From evidence given by military witnesses to inquests held by the City Coroner, it is even possible to pinpoint which units of the British Army were responsible for many of these killings and to see in which areas of the city they were in action at various times.

British armoured car in Foundry St, Ballymacarrett (Illustrated London News, 1st September 1920)

The Norfolks remained in Belfast until at least the spring of 1922; relations between them and the unionist community in general and the RIC and Specials in particular were fractious, possibly due to the fact that during their time in the city, they killed five nationalists but 15 unionists. The hostility of unionists to the Norfolks was so entrenched that the nationalist Irish News ran a satirical article in March 1922, giving a tongue-in-cheek explanation for this:

Tim Wilson has argued convincingly that unionist rage against the Norfolks was borne out of the fact that they were seen as being – to return to Farrell’s formulation – too impartial:

Killings by the police and Specials

As the Special Constabulary, particularly the A Specials, worked alongside the regular RIC and later the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), killings by police and Specials are grouped together here. However, these killings can be divided into two types: those done on duty while acting in an official capacity – although not always acting within the law – and those for which the unofficial police “murder gang” was responsible.

Given that the sub-total of 35 is skewed by killings carried out by the notoriously sectarian Specials, it is somewhat surprising that of the 27 civilians, 16 were nationalist and 11 unionist, suggesting that the regular police also behaved with a degree of impartiality.

The eleventh unionist civilian killed represents an exceptional case. In a previous blog post, the killing of George Walker during an Orange parade was attributed to a nationalist sniper firing indiscriminately at the march. However, subsequent research has revealed that Walker was actually killed by a B Special:

C Specials on duty on Albertbridge Rd in Ballymacarrett

Apart from the killings by police and Specials acting officially, a further 20 nationalists were killed by the RIC “murder gang,” five members of the IRA and 15 civilians.

These killings are attributed to this group of police officers because, in every case, they left behind witnesses – wives, mothers, siblings, a landlady or a grandson. The terror that the “murder gang” intended to instil among nationalists would be deepened if the families could spread the word of what had been done to their loved ones and by whom.

After the Arnon St killings, the widow of Joseph Walsh was asked to attend an identity parade in Brown Square RIC Barracks to pick out those responsible, but when she got there, the police refused to take part:

Members of the RIC “murder gang”: District Inspector John Nixon, Sergeant Christy Clarke, Constable James Glover

Killings by unspecified loyalists

There were 118 people who were killed by loyalists, but it is not possible to state with any certainty which specific organisation killed them. There are a couple of reasons for this.

“Buck Alec” Robinson

The reason it is possible to attribute 118 killings to loyalists, even if it remains impossible to pinpoint which loyalists, is due to the nature of those killings: 68 of them took place at close range, often inside the victims’ own homes or shops, 18 involved unselective bombings or shooting in which the nationalist community was targeted rather than individuals, while 14 involved sniper attacks. The common thread of sectarianism running through these killings clearly points to loyalists as being responsible.

Assigning precise responsibility for loyalist attacks is further complicated by the fact that these were not all carried out by paramilitaries – for example, in relation to snipers, a sympathetic RIC officer provided a statement to an investigator sent north by the Provisional Government:

Brown Square Barracks

For this reason, the category of “unspecified loyalists” includes Specials as well as paramilitaries.

Killings by unspecified nationalists

While the Nationalist Party espoused parliamentary politics, the AOH were no shrinking violets when it came to violence. During the 1918 general election, they battered Sinn Féin election workers and speakers off the Falls Road, contributing to Devlin’s rout of Éamon de Valera at the ballot box. When sectarian conflict erupted in Derry a month before the start of the Belfast Pogrom, they were quick to get involved. John Dillon Nugent, National Secretary of the AOH, reported to the quarterly meeting of the organisation’s governing body that:

Uniformed Hibernians in Glenavy, Co. Antrim

In November 1921, the Belfast-born Monaghan TD Seán MacEntee wrote to de Valera, warning him that the Hibernians were in the process of forming a paramilitary organisation of their own:

Forty-two killings can be attributed to unspecified nationalists, without being able to detail whether these were IRA, Hibernians, ex-servicemen or others. This number is far lower than the comparable figure of 118 killed by unspecified loyalists, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the total of unionists (Crown forces and civilians) killed was considerably less than that of nationalists; secondly, a larger proportion of the unionist fatalities can already be accounted for by the British military or the IRA.

Of the 42, two were Specials, one was a nationalist civilian and the rest were unionist civilians. Twenty-eight of the unionist civilians were killed at close range and it is the circumstances involved – similar in many respects to loyalist killings of nationalists – that allow responsibility to be attributed to nationalists.

Disputed killings

Although there were 180 killings for which the responsibility is unclear, two of those stand out because responsibility was publicly disputed.

On 10th March 1922, while off duty, Lieutenant Edward Bruce of the Seaforth Highlanders was killed at the corner of Alfred St and Ormeau Avenue, between the majority-nationalist Market and majority-unionist Donegall Pass areas. The press on each side was keen to attribute the blame to their political opponents and each side seized on different statements by the Provisional Government to claim that Bruce’s actions had made him a target for those opponents.

The unionist press – including The Times of London – pointed to one statement that Bruce had harassed nationalists on the Falls Road:

However, shortly after this statement was issued, an RIC Sergeant made a statement to a Provisional Government investigator, showing that one Special did have a particular grievance against Bruce:

The second disputed death was that of Constable George Turner, shot dead on the Old Lodge Road in Carrick Hill on 1st April 1922. All accounts agreed that prior to his killing, the area had been quiet; thereafter, they diverged.

Constable George Turner

Both of these versions of events are plausible.

Summary and conclusions

The people killed by the various combatants during the Pogrom largely reflect those groups’ different roles in the conflict.

The IRA in Belfast embarked on the same War of Independence as the organisation elsewhere in the country – the primary target of that campaign was the RIC, the on-the-ground eyes and ears of the British government, so the IRA killed 18 of the 20 RIC who were killed in the city, including Auxiliaries and Black and Tans; responsibility for the killings of Constable Turner and an RIC Sergeant remains unclear.

As initial defence of nationalist areas against mob attacks then developed into a more explicitly sectarian struggle, the IRA killed 11 more unionist combatants – nine Specials and two other loyalists – as well as 24 civilians, all but three of whom were unionists.

The primary function of the British Army was to deal with rioting when the regular police could not do so. Although the RIC was an armed force, accounts of their attempts to separate rioters, at least in the earliest days, tell of them trying to do so using only their batons and having to return to their barracks to get their carbines – for example:

When the police’s efforts failed, they called for military support. British troops were specifically trained to shoot people dead and that is exactly what they did, with warnings but without hesitation. They killed 40 civilians (plus one soldier) during rioting, 24 of whom were unionists; they also killed four curfew-violators and six combatants – three IRA, two loyalists and one Special. That combatants only represented a small proportion of those killed by the British military suggests that confronting the IRA was a secondary priority for them – that task fell primarily to others.

The regular police had two roles: the first was to preserve order in a normal policing sense, which in Belfast meant dealing with communal rioting – in doing this, they killed three nationalist and eight unionist civilians. Their second role was to suppress what was viewed as the “Sinn Fein rebellion;” in this regard, they were augmented by the Specials – the regular police and Specials between them killed seven IRA members and one loyalist combatant.

Those efforts were supplemented by the unofficial police “murder gang,” who killed five IRA members in their homes and 15 nationalist civilians, either at home or having abducted them from their homes.

What have been described here as unspecified loyalist combatants, comprising both paramilitaries and Specials, had one shared task, whether self-assigned or directed by the Unionist government – to crush “Sinn Fein.” Their approach to doing this relied almost entirely on vicarious punishment so their focus was thus directed against nationalist civilians, of whom they killed 99. The 16 members of the IRA and Na Fianna who these loyalists also killed were almost incidental to the civilian fatalities, as they were killed either in the course of, or actively defending against, such attacks.

However, sectarian attacks on civilian opponents were not the sole preserve of loyalist combatants – they were matched in intent and tactics, although not in the number of killings, by unspecified nationalist combatants, who used the same mixture of close-range and sniper attacks, as well as unselective shootings, to kill 38 unionist civilians; they also killed two unionists during rioting, as well as two Specials.

Given that 84% of all those killed during the Pogrom were civilians, it is no surprise that they accounted for the largest percentage of those killed by each of the combatant groups examined.

The IRA might appear to be an exception to this, as “only” 45% of the killings for which it was directly responsible were civilians, but it must be remembered that it also accounted for a proportion of the killings by unspecified nationalists. However, even if all those killings were attributed to the IRA, civilians would still account for a lower percentage of its killings than of any other group, at 67%. This would indicate that it directed its violence against enemy combatants more than other groups did.

The comparable figure for the RIC, RUC and Specials combined is 77%, which includes civilians killed during rioting or for curfew violations. For the police “murder gang,” it was slightly lower at 75%, although after April 1921, they stopped targeting the IRA and instead concentrated solely on killing civilians – IRA member Edward McKinney simply happened to be a lodger of the McMahon family for whom he worked.

Given that its priority was riot control, it is almost remarkable that civilians did not account for more than 86% of those killed by the British military.

The figure for unspecified loyalists is identical, at 86%, while that for unspecified nationalists is highest of all, at 95%. These last two figures jointly illustrate the endpoint of the broad trajectory that the Pogrom took over time: the IRA’s War of Independence led to communal rioting, which was partially suppressed by the RIC and British Army, followed by a low-intensity war between the IRA and the RIC, with a constant potential for sectarian violence to re-ignite.

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