The Dead of the Belfast Pogrom – updated

This post was updated on 16 February 2025 to reflect additional research conducted for the Map of the Belfast Pogrom

The killing of John Taylor on 16 March 1922 turned out to be the result of the unintended discharge of a soldier’s weapon, so his death has been moved to the Accidental group and is no longer included in the total.

The assignment of killings to areas has also been tidied up: for example, killings that happened in North Thomas Street in Sailortown were previously counted under York Street & North Queen Street, but it makes more sense to include them with killings in the docks.

Estimated reading time: 45 minutes.

Introduction

By the time violence erupted in Belfast in the summer of 1920, the War of Independence was already eighteen months old. Although the latter was brought to a close in the south with the signing of the Treaty in December 1921, the Belfast Pogrom continued well into 1922 while at the same time, the northern IRA continued its War of Independence by mounting attacks against the Unionist government of Northern Ireland until the summer of that year.

What happened in Belfast does not strictly conform to dictionary definitions of the word “pogrom” as that term began to be understood in the early twentieth century, most notably in the wake of pogroms directed at Jews in eastern Europe. However, the term was widely used at the time by nationalists, as those against whom the vast majority of the violence in Belfast was directed felt that what was being done to them corresponded with what they understood a pogrom to entail. Respecting that lived experience, I use the word.

Nor is there agreement about the impact of the Pogrom in terms of the number of fatalities involved.

Additional detail came from the press reports of the City Coroner’s inquests held to establish the causes of deaths. These provide more definitive evidence of the circumstances in which people were killed and, in some cases, highlight killings which had originally gone unreported by newspapers – by the later stages of the conflict, the level of violence was such that the Coroner was forced to conduct inquests in batches, so searching for an inquest report for one particular killing could sometimes lead to discovery of an entirely new fatality. So far, press reports of inquests or the proceedings of military courts of inquiry have been identified for 88% of those killed.

Finally, the release of files in the Military Service Pensions Collection (MSPC) show that some of those killed in this period were more involved in the political violence of the time than the Coroner was led to believe.

The chronology of killing

In this section, deaths are recorded as far as possible on the dates on which the incidents occurred, rather than the date of death. Victims could sometimes cling on for weeks or even – in some instances – months after sustaining the injuries that would ultimately prove fatal, so capturing the dates of the incidents gives a more accurate picture of the pattern of violence.

Four distinct peaks can be seen in the killings.

For a month, Belfast was relatively quiet, but worse violence flared after the funeral of Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) District Inspector Oswald Swanzy on 25 August; he had been killed by the IRA in Lisburn several days earlier. In the week that followed, 33 people were killed.

The second peak in killings came in the summer of 1921. On 10 June, the IRA killed Constable James Glover, who they had identified as a member of the “murder gang.” Thirteen people were killed over the next few days, including three Catholic civilians killed by a “murder gang” of RIC Auxiliaries and local Belfast Special Constables.

Three Catholic civilians killed by an RIC “murder gang” in June 1920: William Kerr, Alexander McBride and ex-serviceman Malachy Halfpenny

Of the twenty-five people killed in July, all but one died in the aftermath of an IRA ambush on an RIC patrol in Raglan St in the Lower Falls on 10 July, the day before the Truce came into effect, but one which became known as “Belfast’s Bloody Sunday”. The killings in August were similarly concentrated, all but two of the twenty-four coming in the last three days of the month.

The third peak came in November 1921, which was the worst month yet.

Two significant developments led to 34 killings in the last ten days of that month. The first was that responsibility for security and policing was handed over from the British government to the Unionist government of Northern Ireland, established earlier that year under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act. One of their first acts was to re-mobilise the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), known as the “Specials”, who had been stood down under the terms of the Truce.

The final, most savage and most prolonged peak of killings was not in response to the signing of the Treaty but came in the spring of 1922. This period differed from earlier upsurges in that the killings were not concentrated in a few days – now, they were continuous and sustained.

In the four months from February to May, 229 people were killed, more than in the preceding nineteen months combined. This period also saw the three worst incidents of the whole Pogrom in terms of multiple fatalities.

A religious painting, punctured by bullet-holes, from the McMahon family home (Republican History Museum, Belfast)

The failure of the IRA’s offensive and the introduction of internment by the Unionist government, as well as other provisions of the Special Powers Act, meant the scale of violence gradually diminished over the summer of 1922.

Dead of the Pogrom but not during the Pogrom

In this latest update, three deaths have now been included which occurred after that of Mary Sherlock, so did not occur during the Pogrom, but should be counted as deaths of the Pogrom.

Deaths not included

Among the list of deaths compiled by Hassan, there are a number which, for various reasons, are not included in the total of 500.

In compiling the database, accidental deaths were excluded. While not all victims were individually targeted in particular by their killers, a clear intention to kill someone was required for inclusion – for example, those killed in the IRA tram bombings.

The first week of September 1920 was a confusing one in relation to British military casualties. On 2 September, Lance-Corporal Harold Green was shot and wounded in Sultan Street in the Lower Falls. On 4 September, according to Hassan and to Baker, a Private Charles Harold died in a military hospital as a result of wounds previously received. The original chronology assumed that Kenna and Baker had got the name wrong and that it was Lance-Corporal Green who had died.

However, Eunan O’Halpin and Daithí Ó Corráin’s The Dead of the Irish Revolution brought to light the death of Sergeant Percy Harold Charles Turner. As noted in his death certificate, he died in a Belfast military hospital on 4 September after gangrene had set into a leg wound.

Three of the deaths listed by Hassan could not be corroborated by reports in any of the Belfast newspapers.

Other accidental deaths were not included in Hassan’s list, nor are they included in the total of 500 here.

Altogether, there were 15 accidental Pogrom-related deaths not included in the total of 500: twelve shootings, two people knocked down by a police or military vehicles and one man who jumped from a police tender having been arrested for a curfew violation.

Identities of those killed

If “nationalists” are defined as members of the IRA or Na Fianna and Catholic civilians, and “unionists” defined as British troops, members of the RIC, RUC or USC and Protestant civilians, then we can see an immediate disparity in the fatalities.

In addition, if we look at the relative numbers of killings over time, then the Pogrom can be seen to be composed of two distinct phases.

In the 16 months up to October 1921, there were 164 killings – 80 nationalists and 84 unionists. In other words, an almost-even split.

But as noted above, in November 1921, the Unionist government of Northern Ireland gained control of policing and security and re-mobilised the USC. In the 12 months, there were 334 killings, twice as many as in the first 16 months. However, in this period, the tide turned decisively against nationalists – they were the victims in 199, or 60% of these killings.

If we sub-divide those killed according to which organisation (or none) they belonged to, then we see that the state forces – British military, RIC, RUC and Specials – made up only 8% of the total. Three British soldiers were killed, 20 regular police (including the seven southern-based officers killed in the spring of 1921) and 15 Specials.

Using intelligence supplied by sympathetic policemen, two of the RIC officers killed had been identified by the IRA as being members of the “murder gang”: Constable James Glover, already mentioned, and Sergeant Christy Clarke, killed on 13 March 1922.

Memorial to John Dempsey, Waterford News, 28th March 1958

Imperial Guards in the funeral procession of Herbert Hazzard (Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 18 March 1922)

However, members of all combatant organisations, whether state or Republican, make up only 17% of the killings. The remaining 415 are split between 246 Catholic and 169 Protestant civilians. To describe all of these as “non-combatants” would be a misnomer, as many were killed during rioting.

Crowds scatter as snipers open fire in York St (Illustrated London News, 10 September 1921)

But many more were innocent of any violent activity at the time they were killed: people shot in their homes by stray bullets; people abducted and killed by the police “murder gang”; people shot by snipers from the other side while trying to flee to safety; people killed at, or on their way to or from work; children killed while playing or on their way to Sunday School; people caught by hostile mobs in the wrong place or on the wrong tram.

Of the 500 people killed, 75, or 15%, were female. This relatively high proportion of female fatalities reflects the degree to which the violence was directed at civilians. That figure, in turn, is composed of 54 nationalists and 21 unionists, a split of 72% nationalists and 28% unionists. Compared to the figures for Belfast fatalities as a whole, this shows that female nationalists were at far more risk than their unionist counterparts; given the social roles played by men and women at the time, this in turn implies that the violence was geographically skewed towards where nationalists lived.

The geography of killing

Having looked at the when and the who, the final area to examine is where the killings occurred.

The lists compiled by Hassan and Baker gave the home addresses of those killed, but in this section, deaths are recorded as far as possible in terms of where the fatal incidents took place – again, the intention is to provide a more accurate picture of the patterns of the violence. For example, in the initial outbreak of July 1920, three men who lived in the unionist Shankill area were killed – but they were all shot either in or on the edge of the nationalist Clonard district; recording their deaths as having happened in the latter is more informative.

A shop is looted in Kashmir Road, Clonard, July 1920 (Illustrated London News, 31 July 1920)

The definitions of these areas are admittedly subjective and some of the boundaries used are somewhat arbitrary; for example, Weaver Street, where the children were attacked while playing, was actually off the York Road, which is a continuation of York Street, but here, Weaver Street is included under “York Street & North Queen Street.”

Areas where fewer than ten killings took place are grouped together under “Others.” Finally, some casualties, either already dead or fatally injured, were carried into hospital and it is unclear from press reports where they had been wounded – these are treated as “Unknown.”

Given that the largest concentration of nationalists in Belfast lived in the west of the city – on the Falls Road and in the districts off it (Clonard, the Lower Falls and the streets of the Falls–Shankill interface) – then one might expect that this was where most of the killings took place.

But as the map below shows, it was actually north Belfast – stretching from the docks through to York Street & North Queen Street, Millfield & Carrick Hill, the New Lodge & Oldpark and on out the Crumlin Road to Ardoyne & The ‘Bone – which bore the brunt of the violence. York Street & North Queen Street was the district with the single highest total of killings, at 88.

Across the river in east Belfast, Ballymacarrett was a significant outlier: largely consisting of, but not confined to, the nationalist Short Strand district, this part of the city had the second-highest number of killings, at 79.

A further level of detail can be seen if we sub-divide the killings in each district according to the presumed allegiances of the dead.

In west Belfast as a whole, nationalists made up 62% of the fatalities, but in both Clonard and the Lower Falls, the figure was over 70%. Across the whole of north Belfast, nationalists were 63% of those killed, but this rose to 87% around the docks. In only four districts out of the thirteen were more unionists killed than nationalists: on the Falls-Shankill interface, in Ballymacarrett, the city centre and the Market.

So why, if most nationalists lived in west Belfast, did just over two-thirds of the total number of killings take place in north and east Belfast? There are two possible explanations.

One is that, precisely because so much of the city’s sectarian geography was well-established by 1920 and nationalists were concentrated in west Belfast, the greater homogeneity on and around the Falls Road meant nationalists in west Belfast had strength in numbers as a defence against attack from outside. In contrast, the communities in north Belfast were, at the time, more mixed – even as late as the 1960s, unionists still lived in the New Lodge which nowadays would be considered a republican stronghold; in north Belfast, being less concentrated, nationalists were more vulnerable to attack. Similarly, they were relatively weak in east Belfast – there, a small nationalist enclave had its back to the River Lagan but was otherwise surrounded by unionist opponents.

The other potential explanation – perhaps related – has to do with the development of the IRA in the city.

The Belfast Battalion was initially established in the nationalist heartland of west Belfast and it was not until September 1920 that a 2nd Battalion was formed – its constituent companies were based in various nationalist pockets elsewhere in the city: A Company in Ardoyne & The ‘Bone, B Company in Ballymacarrett, C Company in the Market and D Company in the New Lodge and North Queen Street. Two more battalions were formed after the Truce of 1921, but the records that remain of these battalions are so scant that it is impossible to say with certainty where they were based.

Conclusions

There were two distinct periods within the Pogrom.

In the first, from July 1920 to October 1921, while the general level of underlying violence was almost incessant, actual killings generally peaked when unionists reacted violently to particular actions of the IRA – for example the killings of DI Swanzy, Constables Leonard and Glover and the Raglan Street ambush. However, the balance of killings between the two sides was almost even in this period, indicating that while the IRA and others could not completely defend nationalist areas from attack, nationalists could at least give as good (or bad) as they got.

The turning point of events in the south was the signing of the Treaty in December 1921. But the turning point in Belfast came a month earlier in November, when the Unionist government gained control of the RIC and re-mobilised the Special Constabulary.

This represented a significant realignment of forces and ushered in the second period of the Pogrom, which lasted until October 1922. Now, rather than being sporadic and concentrated into periods of a few days, the killings were almost constant. Now, while there continued to be violent responses by the police “murder gang” to IRA actions – as with the McMahon family and Arnon Street killings – broader unionist violence was less reactive and seemed more aimed at suppressing nationalism entirely. However now, rather than holding their own, nationalists began to be overwhelmed by unionists in and out of uniform and made up 60% of those killed.

The geographical spread of killings within Belfast shows that the worst of the violence took place not, as might be supposed, in west Belfast where nationalists were at their most numerous, but rather in the north and east of the city, where they were at their most vulnerable – in the case of the former, where the communities were less homogenous, and in the latter where a pocket of nationalists was isolated.

So along with Dublin and Cork, Belfast was clearly one of the most violent places in Ireland during the entire revolutionary period. What distinguishes it from anywhere else on the island is the degree to which that violence was consciously directed at civilians – 84% of those killed in Belfast were not members of combatant organisations.

The violence in Belfast was not one-sided, nor were sectarian attacks the exclusive preserve of one side. But as previously noted, in a city in which nationalists made up just under a quarter of the population, they were the victims in over half of the killings. So, it is clear that the political violence of the Belfast Pogrom was perpetrated against this minority to a hugely disproportionate degree.

Leave a comment

References

Leave a comment